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OYEZ, OYEZ, THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY IS IN SESSION:
A LOOK AT THE ROLE OF AGENCIES AND COURTS IN RECENT
CASES APPLYING THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE
JOHN M. SCHEIB*
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n 1984, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a test that defers to
regulatory agencies when construing ambiguous statutes. From the earliest
days of the Republic, however, that task fell to the courts. The result of Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 has been a shift of the
role of interpreting statutes from the courts to regulatory agencies.
Some early commenters did not view Chevron as a major shift.2 After
analyzing Supreme Court cases decided in the aftermath of Chevron, others
concluded that not much had changed.3 However, most cases never make it to
the Supreme Court. The real test of the impact of a Supreme Court decision is
how lower courts apply a rule of law announced by the Supreme Court.
Prior studies have looked at the behavior of lower courts immediately prior
to and immediately after Chevron and concluded that Chevron resulted merely in
a “significant but subtle change[] in legal doctrine[].” 4 Equally significant,
however, is how the law “settles out” after years of implementation by lower
courts filling in the gaps. Thus, to truly answer the question posed by E. Donald
Elliott—“[has] the Chevron doctrine really affected the way that . . . courts
decide cases”—additional study of lower court decisions is needed.5
A survey of recent cases decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) is instructive. That survey, which is presented in this
article, demonstrates that in cases decided in 2012, 2013, and 2014, the D.C.
Circuit overturned agency interpretations or applications of statutes about 60%
of the time when the statute was unambiguous. However, when the statute was
ambiguous, the D.C. Circuit almost always deferred to the agency’s interpretation

*
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969 (1992).
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of the statute. Thus, it is nearly impossible to get an agency interpretation of an
ambiguous statute overturned, which supports the theory that agencies are now
the interpreter of ambiguous statutes.
Some have argued that this transfer of power is appropriate or acceptable
because regulatory agencies are subject to indirect political accountability. To
the extent that this political accountability even exists at a time when the
accountability for any one regulation is diluted by the fact that federal agencies
are issuing thousands of rules each year, it is not an applicable rationale to most
independent agencies, which by definition are insulated from political
accountability.
II. THE COURT WAS THE INTERPRETER OF LAWS
Justice Thomas recently addressed the role of the separation of powers.6 He
noted that, rooted in history and centuries of political philosophy, the Founders
sought to implement the principles of power separation. 7 Among other things,
they freed judges from external influences. 8 In contrast, they explicitly tied
legislators and the executive to those influences. 9
The Founders contemplated that the judiciary should have the role of
interpreting statutes. Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist 22:
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains
yet to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead
letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and
operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all,
must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as
far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by
judicial determinations.10
In Federalist 78, Hamilton explained the rationale for why judicial
interpretations of statutes should be definitive; the courts after all are “an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.” 11 Hamilton
discussed the relation of the judiciary to the other two branches of government
and noted how important it was to separate those who “expound and define [the]
true meaning” of laws from the legislative and executive branches. 12
It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then
proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can
never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary
6. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213-25 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
7. See id. at 1215-17.
8. See id. at 1217 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
9. See id. at 1218-19 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2–3; art. II, § 1).
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
11. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
12. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 10, at 112.
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remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For
I agree, that “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers.”13
As the new Constitution sprung to life, the three branches of government
sought to implement these lofty principles. Justice Thomas points out that long
before the Constitution, judges had recognized and asserted their role to apply the
law.14 In Marbury v. Madison,15 however, the Supreme Court marched stalwartly
into the separation of powers breach and asserted the role of the courts under the
new Constitution.16 “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” 17
Determining the meaning of a statute, therefore, was the prerogative of the
courts. Again, the views of the executive and the legislators may, by design, shift
with the political winds. In their minds, the meaning of a statute may similarly
shift with those same winds—particularly when years have passed since the
adoption of the statute.18 But, the judiciary is insulated. For judges, the meaning
of the statute does not change with the political winds.
III. WHAT IS THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE?
The Chevron two-step framework for reviewing an agency’s interpretation
of a statute is now well known.19 So only a brief review is necessary.
Under Chevron step one, the court must first determine “whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 20 In answering this question,
the court reviews the statute de novo,21 “employing traditional tools of statutory
construction.”22 The rationale for Chevron step one is similar to the holding in
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 11, at 392.
14. See Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1215-18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
15. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
16. See id.; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983).
17. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
18. Of course, if the political winds have changed such that the legislators and the
executive desire to change the law, the Constitution provides a process for that to happen. The
legislators may pass new or amended statutes, and the executive can sign those statutes into
law.
19. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(summarizing two-step analytical process).
20. Id. at 842; see also Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769, 785-90 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (discussing application of Chevron); Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901
F.2d 147, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (discussing Chevron).
21. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 310 F.3d 202, 205-06 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (“Because the judiciary functions as the final authority on issues of statutory
construction, [a]n agency is given no deference at all on the question whether a statute is
ambiguous.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Petit, 675 F.3d at 781 (“Appellants are correct that
we must start with the statute’s text.”); PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362
F.3d 786, 794 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ne cannot understand a statute merely by understanding
the words in it.”); Wells Fargo, 310 F.3d at 205-06 (“Because the judiciary functions as the
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Marbury: “Because the judiciary functions as the final authority on issues of
statutory construction, [a]n agency is given no deference at all on the question
whether a statute is ambiguous.” 23 As the D.C. Circuit has observed about its
own employment of traditional tools of statutory construction, however, “[t]his
court’s decisions discussing the application of these canons at Chevron step one
are not entirely consistent.”24 In sum, at Chevron step one, if the intent of
Congress is clear, then the court’s inquiry ends, and the clear and unambiguous
statutory language controls.25
If Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
reviewing court proceeds to Chevron step two. Under step two, “[i]f Congress
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are . . . manifestly contrary to the statute.”26 Stated differently, “[t]he question

final authority on issues of statutory construction, [a]n agency is given no deference at all on
the question whether a statute is ambiguous.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Cty. of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[T]o prevent
statutory interpretation from degenerating into an exercise in solipsism, ‘we must not be guided
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
law.’ . . . ‘[W]e consider not only the language of the particular statutory provision under
scrutiny, but also the structure and context of the statutory scheme of which it is a part.’”)
(citations omitted)); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(characterizing Chevron step one inquiry “as a search for the plain meaning of the
statute . . . . The literal language of a provision taken out of context cannot provide conclusive
proof of congressional intent, any more than a word can have meaning without context to
illuminate its use.”).
23. Wells Fargo, 310 F.3d at 205-06 (alteration in original) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
24. Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 443 (D.C. Cir.
2012); see also Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 406-07 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (questioning whether
court must look at legislative history at Chevron step one); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 131 F.3d at 1047
(noting courts must “exhaust the traditional tools of [statutory] construction” at Chevron step
one) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the court in Duncan pointed out, there
are numerous examples of such inconsistent application. Compare Indep. Ins. Agents of Am.,
Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting agency’s interpretation at step
one based on the tandem “cannons of avoiding surplusage and expressio unius”), with Mobile
Comm. Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Expressio unius ‘is simply
too thin a reed to support the conclusion that Congress has clearly resolved [an] issue.’”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)), and Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp.,
940 F.2d 685, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A] congressional prohibition of particular conduct may
actually support the view that the administrative entity can exercise its authority to eliminate a
similar danger.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). But the Duncan court also made
clear that “a court need not follow these canons, when they do ‘not hold up in the statutory
context.’” See Duncan, 681 F.3d at 444. (citation omitted).
25. See Petit, 675 F.3d at 778; Northeast Hosp. Corp. v. Sebelius, 657 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984));
see also Merrill, supra note 3, at 977 (“The two-step structure makes deference an all-or-nothing
matter. If the court resolves the question at step one, then it exercises purely independent
judgment and gives no consideration to the executive view.”).
26. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see also Duncan, 681 F.3d at 441; HARRY T. EDWARDS
& LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW
OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND Agency ACTIONS 141 (2007); Merrill, supra note 3, at
977 (“If [the court] resolves the question at step two, then it applies a standard of maximum
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for a reviewing court is whether in doing so the agency has acted reasonably and
thus has ‘stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.’” 27 The rationale for
deference to agencies in this step is the legal fiction that Congress provided
discretion for agencies to fill in the blanks. In short, if a statute is ambiguous and
an agency’s interpretation of that statute is reasonable, the court defers to the
agency’s interpretation.28
To be a reasonable statutory interpretation, the interpretation must account
for both “the specific context in which [the] language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole.”29 A statutory “provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” 30 Thus, an agency
interpretation that is “inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the statute as
a whole” does not merit deference.31
There are at least two significant legal changes embedded in Chevron, both
of which altered the relationship between courts and agencies in statutory
interpretation. First, “[i]n effect, Chevron transformed a regime that allowed
courts to give agencies deference along a sliding scale into a regime with an
on/off switch.”32 Second, the Court’s new framework inverted the traditional
default rule. In the pre-Chevron period, deference to executive interpretations
required special justification; independent judgment was the default rule. Under
Chevron, the court must initially establish whether the issue is suitable for
independent judicial resolution; if it is not, the court automatically shifts into a
deferential mode. As a result, independent judgment by a court now requires
special justification, and judicial deference is the default rule. If, as the Court in
Chevron seemed to suggest, the circumstances justifying independent judgment
were defined narrowly, this inversion portended a major transfer of interpretative
power from courts to agencies.33

deference.”).
27. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014) (quoting City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1864 (2013)).
28. The D.C. Circuit has said that at step two, “we ask whether the [agency] has
reasonably explained how the permissible interpretation it chose is ‘rationally related to the
goals of’ the statute.” See Village of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 665
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999)); see also
Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“A ‘reasonable’ explanation
of how an agency’s interpretation serves the statute’s objectives is the stuff of which a
‘permissible’ construction is made . . . .” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Bell Atl. Tel.
Cos., 131 F.3d at 1049 (“[W]e will defer to the [agency’s] interpretation if it is reasonable and
consistent with the statutory purpose and legislative history.” (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)). The Supreme Court recently noted that “[e]ven under this deferential standard,
however, ‘agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’” Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442).
29. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
30. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988).
31. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2529 (2013).
32. Merrill, supra note 3, at 977.
33. See id.
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To support a legal test that made deference to administrative agencies the
default rule, the Court relied on a theory of political accountability. Unlike
federal courts, which are insulated from politics, an agency is indirectly
accountable democratically through the oversight and supervision of the
President, who is directly accountable to the people.34 “While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices . . . .”35 What about Congress, the maker of law pursuant to Article I of
the Constitution, whose members are directly accountable to the people? The
Chevron Court ruled that whenever Congress delegated to an agency the authority
to administer a statute, it also delegated the authority for the agency to interpret
ambiguities in the statute.36
In addition to the political accountability rationale for Chevron, the Court
also relied on a theory of agency expertise. Under this theory, it is supposed that
Congress left the statute ambiguous precisely so that the experts at an agency
could fill in the blanks using their subject matter expertise. 37 Indeed, as experts
gain more knowledge, they would have the flexibility to alter interpretation to
meet changing situations.
Some legal experts have added another rationale. Although commentators
give it different names, essentially it is congressional intent. The rationale
assumes that by leaving a statute ambiguous, it is the intent of Congress that
courts defer to the agency’s interpretation of a statute.38 This rationale seems to
hold up better for statutes enacted after Chevron was decided—when Congress is
legislating against the backdrop of the Chevron doctrine and can make a judgment
about whether to be specific or ambiguous in a statute. But even then, it seems
to ignore the constitutional role of the courts—as envisioned by the Founders—
“to say what the law is” as enacted by Congress. 39
IV. DATA ON RECENT CASES IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT SUGGEST THAT THERE HAS
BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE RELATIVE ROLES OF
THE COURTS AND AGENCIES POST-CHEVRON
Thomas Merrill has observed that “Chevron is widely regarded as a kind of
‘counter-Marbury’ for the administrative state. Indeed, read for all it is worth,
the decision would make administrative actors the primary interpreters of federal
statutes and relegate courts to the largely inert role of enforcing unambiguous
statutory terms.”40 Data on recent applications of the Chevron doctrine by the
34. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66. This
rationale seems to be based on the theory of a unitary executive.
35. Id. at 865.
36. See id. at 843-44.
37. See id. at 865.
38. See David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 681 (1997).
39. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
40. Merrill, supra note 3, at 969-70. Merrill concluded that “[i]t turns out that the Court
does not regard Chevron as a universal test for determining when to defer to executive
interpretations.” Id. at 970. But his conclusions are based on the Supreme Court’s later

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss6/3

6

Scheib: Oyez, Oyez, The Administrative Agency Is In Session: A Look At Th

2016]

APPLYING THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE

43

D.C. Circuit suggest that, perhaps, the Chevron doctrine is being applied in a way
that minimizes the role of courts to interpret the law.
In the wake of the Chevron decision, commentators argued about whether
the decision and its two-step analysis would have an effect on subsequent cases.
In a 1991 article, E. Donald Elliott and Peter H. Schuck studied cases from lower
courts decided in the six months prior to and the six months after the Supreme
Court’s decision in INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca,41 in which the Supreme Court
clarified and reiterated the Chevron doctrine.42 Elliott and Schuck summarized
their findings as follows:
We found a statistically significant increase in the level of deference the
courts were paying to agency decisions. In other words, the pattern of
courts affirming agency decisions went from approximately 71% to
approximately 81%, and this change is highly statistically significant
because of the large number of cases considered.43
In 1992, Thomas W. Merrill conducted a study of the Supreme Court’s own
application of the Chevron doctrine in the years immediately after the Chevron
decision.44 He reached two conclusions. “First, it is clear that Chevron is often
ignored by the Supreme Court.”45 Second, although noting that the number of
cases examined “is too small to attribute significance to the precise percentages,”
he determined that “there is no discernible relationship between the application
of the Chevron framework and greater acceptance of the executive view.”46 This
conclusion was based on the observation that:
[I]n the cases actually applying the Chevron framework in the postChevron period—59% adopting the agency view—with either the
overall acceptance rate in the post-Chevron period (70%) or the rate in
the pre-Chevron era (75%). Paradoxically, it appears that adoption of
the Chevron framework has meant, if anything, a decline in deference
to agency views.47
Understandably, Merrill attempted to reconcile his findings with those of the
Schuck and Elliott study. His conclusion in part was that Schuck and Elliott
studied lower courts and that “[l]ower courts probably take Supreme Court
opinions more seriously than does the Court itself.” 48 In addition, he stated that

decisions, not on lower courts’ implementation.
41. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
42. See generally Schuck & Elliott, supra note 2.
43. Elliott, supra note 5, at 9.
44. See generally Merrill, supra note 3.
45. Id. at 982. One way around Chevron is for the Court to determine that the agency’s
interpretation is not reasonable, which engenders disputes among the Justices because the
standard is so ambiguous. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (reaching 5-4 decision
with majority holding agency interpretation failed Chevron Step Two and with Justices arguing
about whether agency interpretation was reasonable).
46. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 984.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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“there is evidence in the Schuck and Elliott study that suggests the ‘Chevron
effect’ in the lower courts may have been only temporary.” 49 His thought was
that the “Chevron effect” might continue to diminish “as it became increasingly
evident over time that the Supreme Court employs the Chevron approach only
sporadically. . . .”50
It seems reasonable, after the passage of time, to examine whether the
“Chevron effect” has in fact diminished. Because so many appeals from federal
agency action are heard by the D.C. Circuit, one would naturally look at how that
court has applied Chevron recently. In calendar years 2012, 2013, and 2014, the
D.C. Circuit decided 57 cases using the Chevron analysis.51 In two of those cases,
the court considered two separate questions in which it applied the Chevron
analysis. A table of those cases is provided as Appendix A to this article.
Those 59 applications of Chevron can then be categorized based on two
criteria. The first criterion is whether the case was resolved at Chevron step one
or Chevron step two; the second criterion is whether the court (a) affirmed the
agency or (b) remanded to or reversed the agency. Table 1 shows the results of
this categorization, and Table 2 provides a further analysis of the data.
TABLE 1
Agency Affirmed
Agency Reversed
Total

Step 1
9
14
23

Step 2
34
2
36

TABLE 2
Agency reversed overall
When case resolved at Chevron Step 1, agency
reversed
When case resolved at Chevron Step 2, agency
reversed

27%
61%
6%

From these data, we see that twenty-three issues were decided by the court
applying Chevron step one. Of those cases, the agency was overturned in
fourteen—or sixty percent of the cases. Stated differently, in sixty percent of the
cases, the agency misinterpreted or misapplied an unambiguous statute. The
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Two cases were omitted because the court determined that the agency’s position was
clearly incorrect or correct on the statute and did not appear to apply a Chevron analysis. See
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util.
Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 680 F.3d 819 (D.C. Cir. 2012). To the extent they should
have been included in the data, both would have been categorized as Chevron step one, and, in
one case, the agency was affirmed and in the other reversed. Accordingly, the trends in the data
would not have been altered.
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remaining thirty-six issues were decided at Chevron step two. Of those, the
agency was overturned only twice in three years.
What can we glean from these data about the D.C. Circuit’s application of
Chevron during this time period? Like Merrill concluded, it is worth observing
that the number of cases examined “is too small to attribute significance to the
precise percentages . . . .”52 But also like Merrill found, the data reveal at least a
“general phenomenon.”53 In fact, we can glean two lessons, one related to
litigants and the second related to the relationship between the courts and
agencies.
First, the appellant’s chances of getting the agency reversed were
substantially better if the court applied Chevron step one. If the appellant could
convince the court to view the dispute as one of interpretation of an unambiguous
statute, the appellant had a better chance of getting the court to overturn the
agency interpretation. Although the court reversed the agency in only twentyseven percent of the cases overall, there was a sixty-one percent reversal rate if
the court resolved the issue at Chevron step one. The implication for appellants
is that attempting to show that the statute is clear and that the agency
misinterpreted it is the better path to success. At the same time, the court seems
to decide substantially fewer cases under Chevron step one.
More often, however, the court decides the case under Chevron step two. Of
course, as the data show, there is an incentive for the agency to contend that the
statute is ambiguous. Indeed, in a recent case in which the Court ruled an
agency’s interpretation of a statute was unreasonable under Chevron step two,
Justice Thomas noted that “we should be alarmed that [the agency] felt
sufficiently emboldened by [the Court’s] precedents to make the bid for deference
that it did here.”54 Although we should be alarmed, perhaps we should not be
surprised because it is clear that the appellant has a far steeper hill to climb under
Chevron step two to convince the court to overturn the agency’s interpretation.
The deference given to the agency for articulating any reasonable interpretation—
even if it is one with which the court itself would disagree—proves to often be
insurmountable. The six percent reversal rate at Chevron step two suggests there
is very infrequently a role for the judiciary at this step.
Second, it seems clear that Chevron has altered the relationship between
courts, Congress, and the executive. Looking at statements made by the court in
individual cases is also telling as to the extent to which the relationship among
the branches has been altered. In Gentiva Healthcare Corp. v. Sebelius,55 Gentiva
contended that the Department of Health and Human Services had acted
unlawfully by delegating certain tasks to a contractor. The court determined that
the statute at issue “is not unambiguous and the Secretary’s reading is not
unreasonable.”56 Nevertheless, the court noted that “although we believe Gentiva

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See Merrill, supra note 3, at 984.
See id.
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
723 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 295.
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may have the better reading [of the statute], we must defer to the Secretary.” 57
Whether the court was correct, the statement indicates the extent to which
Chevron deference has rendered courts irrelevant as the decider of what the law
is. Although the Gentiva court thought that the proper legal interpretation was
something else, it was bound by Chevron to uphold a reasonable interpretation of
the statute by the agency. Gentiva demonstrates the point made by Justice
Thomas:
Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising that judgment,
forcing them to abandon what they believe is “the best reading of an
ambiguous statute” in favor of an agency’s construction. It thus wrests
from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to “say what the law
is,” and hands it over to the Executive. 58
One interpretation of the data is that if the court determines that the statute
is clear, it has found that the court has only been correct in interpreting that clear
meaning of the statute in fewer than forty percent of the cases. But if the statute
is unclear, the court has determined that the agency decision is due deference
thirty-four out of thirty-six times—or in about ninety-four percent of the cases.
Somehow, it seems wrong that application of a legal rule like Chevron would
result in a court so reliably deferring to agencies on unclear questions while so
frequently disagreeing with the agency on how to interpret an unambiguous
statute. If the agency gets straightforward interpretations of statutes wrong in
about sixty percent of decided cases, why should a rule of law be so deferential
to the agency when the interpretation question is even more difficult?
Ironically, one of the exceptions to the Chevron doctrine that has sprung up
is that agencies are not entitled to deference when a statute applies to more than
one agency, such as the Freedom of Information Act. 59 The logic of that
exception is somewhat astounding because it seems to be that the court “must
decide for [itself] the best reading” of the statute out of fear that agencies might
interpret it differently.60 That rationale sounds a bit like something from Article
III of the U. S. Constitution as explained in Marbury, except that the worry should
not be whether agencies interpret it differently. The concern should be whether

57. Id. (citation omitted).
58. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
59. See Pub. Inv’rs Arbitration Bar Ass’n v. SEC, 771 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“‘[B]ecause FOIA’s terms apply government-wide,’ moreover, ‘we generally decline to accord
deference to agency interpretations of the statute, as we would otherwise do under Chevron.’”)
(quoting Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also Tax Analysts v. IRS,
117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[W]e will not defer to an agency’s view of FOIA’s
meaning . . . . no one federal agency administers FOIA . . . . one agency’s interpretation of
FOIA is therefore no more deserving of judicial respect than the interpretation of any other
agency.”); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.2d 730,
734 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to accord Chevron deference to Justice Department
interpretation of FOIA exemptions because FOIA “applies to all government agencies, and thus
no one executive branch entity is entrusted with its primary interpretation”), rev’d on other
grounds, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
60. See Miller v. Clinton, 687 F.3d 1332, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Landmark
Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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they interpret the statute correctly. Indeed, nothing is inherently different about
an agency’s interpretation skills when a statute applies to multiple agencies.
Given that the data seem to suggest that the agency wrongly interprets the statute
in about sixty percent of cases when Chevron applies and the statute is
unambiguous, it would seem that the courts are needed to determine what the law
is even when the statute applies to only one agency.
In addition to rendering courts largely irrelevant, Chevron has, in some
ways, neutered Article I of the Constitution. Article I vests “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted” in the Congress. 61 Agencies, unlike courts, are not
searching for the law duly passed by the legislature. They are making policy—a
fact that was acknowledged by the Court in Chevron.62 As Justice Thomas
describes it, “[s]tatutory ambiguity thus becomes an implicit delegation of rulemaking authority, and that authority is used not to find the best meaning of the
text, but to formulate legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on policy
judgments made by the agency rather than Congress.”63
Only the most brazen actions by agencies have resulted in the courts taking
action. For example, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,64 the Supreme
Court struck down agency action in which the agency attempted blatantly to
substitute its judgment of what the law should be for the express action of
Congress.65
Were we to recognize the authority claimed by EPA in the Tailoring
Rule, we would deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s separation of
powers. Under our system of government, Congress makes laws and
the President, acting at times through agencies like EPA, “faithfully
execute[s]” them. The power of executing the laws necessarily includes
both authority and responsibility to resolve some questions left open by
Congress that arise during the law’s administration. But it does not
include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work
in practice.66
Paraphrasing Justice Thomas, the shocking part of the case was that the agency
tried to alter the clear statutory terms in the first place.
Furthermore, under Chevron’s progeny, an agency can determine over time
that the same statute has diametrically different meanings—without any further
act of Congress. Under Chevron, an agency is able to say at one moment that the
statute means “X” and later say the statute means “not X.”67 As long as the
agency provides a reasoned explanation, the agency is free to change direction

61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
62. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
63. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
65. See generally id.
66. Id. at 2446 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
67. See Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir.
2012); see also Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)
(discussing ability of agencies to change interpretive stances).
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completely from what it originally thought Congress meant. 68 The ability of the
agency to flip-flop on its interpretation of a statute, so long as it offers a new
reasonable explanation, is further evidence that the agency is not looking for the
meaning of the statutory text or the will of Congress. 69 Indeed, the discussions
of this rule rely on the ability of the agency to change “policy” rather than on the
ability of the agency to determine what the law is.70 Changing the law so
dramatically—from “X” to “not X”—is the role of Congress and not of an agency
under Article I.
V. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY ACTIONS IS THE ONLY
CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK ON AGENCY ACTIONS
An agency is an extension of the executive. There are two schools of thought
regarding the extent to which the agency is part of the Presidency—(1) whether
the President is the ultimate decider of questions through agency personnel or (2)
whether the agency is an extension of the executive branch over which the
President is merely an overseer.71 The first school of thought is rooted in the
68. The court in Duncan summarized the law. See Duncan, 681 F.3d at 441 (citations
omitted) (noting general approach for addressing altered agency interpretations).
69. See White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
rev’d by Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). In White Stallion, the court noted:
To the extent petitioners’ challenge concerns EPA’s change in interpretation from
that in 2005, our approach is the same because “[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis
for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework.”
That is, “if the agency adequately explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, change
is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion
provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.” And while
“[u]nexplained inconsistency” may be “a reason for holding an interpretation to be
an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice,” our review of a change in
agency policy is no stricter than our review of an initial agency action. Thus,
although an agency may not “depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply
disregard rules that are still on the books,” the agency “need not demonstrate to a
court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for
the old one.” Rather, “it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute,
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better.”
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
70. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 636 (“But so long as an agency ‘adequately explains the
reasons for a reversal of policy,’ its new interpretation of a statute cannot be rejected simply
because it is new.”) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 981 (2005)).
71. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702-03 (2007). Strauss writes:
On the one hand, the opening words of Article II locate all executive power in the
President, and the Philadelphia convention famously and emphatically rejected any
idea of a collegial executive. Those who take the strongest perspective on what it
means to have a unitary chief executive thus argue that when Congress assigns a
matter for decision to a constituent element of the executive branch, it does so only
for convenience—that, as a matter of constitutional power, the President has the right
to decide it. On the other hand, the Constitution twice refers to “duties” or “powers”
assigned to other officers. Article II in terms gives the President only the right to
seek from those officers a written opinion about their exercise of those duties (i.e., it
does not say he may command their exercise of the duties assigned to them), and it
concludes that he is responsible to see to it that the laws “be faithfully executed”—
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statement in Article II of the Constitution that provides that “[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America” 72 and in the
President’s obligation to ensure that the laws of the country are faithfully
executed.73 The second school of thought finds its origins in other provisions of
the Constitution that provide: (1) Congress the authority to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof,”74 and (2) that the President “may require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices,” which implies
these agency officers have powers over which the President is the overseer. 75
In some ways, this debate may be largely academic. At the end of the day,
as Justice Scalia wrote, “[i]t is not for us to determine, and we have never
presumed to determine, how much of the purely executive powers of government
must be within the full control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that
they all are.”76
In either event, the President appoints the leaders of executive agencies, even
if most agency employees are career bureaucrats. And these administrators
execute the law by, among other things, adopting rules and regulations. Their
ability to adopt rules and regulations is limited to the express powers given to
them in statutes. Thus, agencies must execute those statutes by reading and
understanding what they mean.
Agencies can be held accountable for the way they execute those statutes in

i.e., as if by others. From this perspective, as some (but not all) Attorneys General
have concluded, when Congress creates duties in others, that act creates in the
President constitutional obligations not only to oversee but also to respect their
independent exercise of those duties. Just as he must respect a statutory framework
that assigns care for the national parks to the Department of the Interior, and care for
the national forests to the Department of Agriculture, on this view, he must respect a
statutory framework that assigns actual decision making about particular issues
affecting air quality to the EPA; he is entitled only to his (inevitably political)
oversight.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
There is an alternative view that the president is the decider of issues through agencies.
See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 549-50 (1994); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J.
Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 730
(2005). There is also a view that the Constitution does not confer decisional authority, but it
should be presumed Congress intends it, given the realities of modern administration. See Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001); Lawrence Lessig
& Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994).
Additionally, some believe that the President, unless directly authorized, is only an overseer.
See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987-89 (1997); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory
Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006); Peter L. Strauss,
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 984-86 (1997).
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
73. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
76. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 709 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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three ways. The first is through congressional oversight and budget control,
which has not been used as a rationale in the debate over Chevron. The second—
at least for agencies that are not independent agencies 77—is through the political
accountability of the President. The third is through judicial review by courts.
The proper roles of political accountability and judicial review have been the
subject of debate regarding the proper role of the courts under the separation of
powers.
Political accountability is most often referenced when evaluating the proper
extent for courts to defer to agencies. The theory goes that if an agency makes
an unwise decision, the President will feel the political consequences through
pressures from the public or ultimately at the ballot box—directly in his reelection if he is a first term President and potentially indirectly through
congressional elections. The notion of political accountability was noted by the
Supreme Court in Marbury:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use
his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his own conscience. 78
Supporters of this theory of political accountability contend then that
agencies should have latitude to interpret statutes themselves and that courts
should defer to those interpretations because the President is directly accountable
to the people through the political process and courts are not. This analysis
misses the mark because what a statute means is not dependent upon whether the
people like it or not. It really misses the mark when agencies attempt to alter the
interpretation of statutes long ago enacted because the political winds change.
And it misses the mark when the agency is an independent agency, which means
that by design it is insulated from the direct control of the President. Indeed, this

77. The extent to which independent agencies are subject to political accountability is
debatable, although it is certainly to a lesser extent than executive branch agencies. See Elena
Kagan, supra note 71; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 591 (1984). The Supreme Court’s
precedent on the extent of political influence over independent agencies is not consistent.
Compare SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 682 (10th Cir. 1988) (“The President
has the power to appoint the commissioners; he has the power to choose the chairman of the
SEC who has broad powers concerning the operation and administration of the commission; the
chairman serves at the President’s pleasure; and, the President has the power to remove a
commissioner for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. We conclude these
powers give the President sufficient control over the commissioners to insure the securities laws
are faithfully executed and the removal restrictions do not impede the President’s ability to
perform his constitutional duty.”), with Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(rejecting removal premised on lack of agreement on either policies or administering of Federal
Trade Commission because FTC was designed to be “independent in character,” “free from
political domination or control,” and not “subject to anybody in the government” or “to the
orders of the President”). A somewhat extensive discussion is included in Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., but the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on Weiner may have been
misplaced given the actual holding in Humphrey’s Executor. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 679-80 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
78. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-66 (1803).
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analysis ignores the Constitution. Although the law may need to change, the
constitutional path to change is through the legislature and then to the executive
for signature or veto.
The political accountability theory is more debatable in the current age—the
age of the administrative state. There are now scores of executive agencies taking
literally thousands of actions each year. According to a Congressional Research
Service report, from 1997 to 2012, the number of final rules issued by the federal
government each year has ranged from 2,482 in 2012 to 4,388 in 1998. 79
The political pressure related to any one action is therefore theoretical at best
because the general public is often unaware of most of those actions. Many policy
decisions made by agencies affect only a sliver of the electorate. Indeed, the
general public may have little interest in, for example, a regulation issued by the
Federal Aviation Administration “requiring helicopter pilots to use a route one
mile off the north shore of Long Island, New York for the purpose of noise
abatement in residential areas.”80 It would certainly be a stretch to argue that
such a regulation had broad enough appeal for a particular election to be a
referendum on it.
Judicial review provides the other opportunity to hold agencies accountable.
It affords a party the opportunity to challenge the execution of the law by the
agency in court. The court therefore plays a role in ensuring that, among other
things, the agency does not act outside the scope of its powers or inconsistently
with the statutes properly adopted by the legislators and signed by the President
in accordance with the Constitution. “[T]he particular phraseology of the
Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and the courts as well as other departments are bound by that
instrument.”81 With its separate powers and independent obligation to the
Constitution, the judiciary is a line of defense against unlawful agency action.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Chevron doctrine attempted to accommodate the growth of the
administrative state. However, it has done so at the expense of the judicial check
on executive power and the constitutional requirements for enacting the laws or
changes to the laws of the United States. The data from the D.C. Circuit seem to
indicate that the judiciary is no longer the last line of defense against unlawful
agency action. That agencies are overturned in more than sixty percent of cases
in which the law is unambiguous, but rarely ever overturned when the statute is
ambiguous, seems to demonstrate that the courts no longer play the role of
determining “what the law is” as described in Marbury.82 Cases like Gentiva, in

79. See MAEVE P. CARVEY, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF
RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 5
(May 1, 2013).
80. Helicopter Ass’n Int’l v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
81. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180.
82. See id. at 177.
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which courts openly state that they think the agency’s interpretation may not be
correct but is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, further confirm
the diminished role of the judiciary.
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APPENDIX A:
2013 CASES IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT APPLYING CHEVRON
Where the court found under Step One tha t s ta tute wa s cl ea r a nd neverthel es s conti nued to Step Two, the ca s es wa s cl a s s i fi ed a s a Step One ca s e.
**

Ca s es omi tted beca us e a rgua bl y not Chevron ca s es .
chevron and agency and defer! and date(geq (01/01/2012) and leq

Independent

Chevron Step Applied

Agency

(12/31/2013))

Agency?

Step 1

Upheld

Gaughf Props., L.P. v. Comm'r, 738 F.3d 415

No

1

1

Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC & United States, 738 F.3d 397

Yes

1

1

Newspaper Ass'n of Am. v. Postal Regulatory Comm'n, 734 F.3d

No

1

1

Riffin v. Surface Transp. Bd., 733 F.3d 340

Yes

1

1

Nat'l Ass'n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115

No

1

Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230

Yes

1

Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180

No

Gentiva Healthcare Corp. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 292

No

Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, Inc. v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430

No

1

Safari Club Int'l v. Jewell (In re Polar Bear Endangered Species ..., 720 F.3d 354

No

1

Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 914

No

1

Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Com..., 717 F.3d 1020

No

1

Nat'l Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones, 716 F.3d 200

No

Blue Ridge Envtl. Def. League v. NRC, 716 F.3d 183

Yes

Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947

Yes

1

Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. United States EPA, 714 F.3d 608

No

1

Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States DOT, 714 F.3d 580

No

Step 2

Overturned

1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1

Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States DOT, 724 F.3d 206

Agency

1

s a me ca s e a s i mmedi a tel y a bove

AFGE, AFL-CIO, Local 3669 v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 29

No

Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 708 F.3d 183

Yes

1

1

Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. NRC, 707 F.3d 371

Yes

1
1

1

1

New Eng. Power Generators Ass'n v. FERC, 707 F.3d 364

Yes

1

1

Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass'n v. United States DOE, 706 F.3d 499

No

EchoStar Satellite L.L.C. v. FCC, 704 F.3d 992

Yes

NRDC v. EPA, 706 F.3d 428

No

Coalition for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. United ..., 707 F.3d 311

No

Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534

Yes

Desert Citizens Against Pollution v. EPA, 699 F.3d 524

No

EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7

No

Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428

No

Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813

No

Rural Cellular Ass'n & Universal Serv. v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083

Yes

Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102

No

Ass'n of Private Sector Colleges & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427

No

1

1

Petit v. USDE, 675 F.3d 769

No

1

1

AKM LLC v. Sec'y of Labor, 675 F.3d 752

No

**

Ma ck Trucks , Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87

No

x

**

Na t'l As s 'n of Regul a tory Uti l . Comm'rs v. Uni ted Sta tes DOE, 680 F.3d 819

No

x

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Agency affirmed

Agency reversed

Step 1

Step 1
20

1
1

1
x
x

13

7

1

1

Tota l

Step 2

1

1

22

28

7

Step 2
6

1

SAMPLE SIZE = 34 applications of Chevron
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2014 CASES IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT APPLYING CHEVRON
Independent

Chevron Step Applied

Agency

Agency

a nd l eq (12/31/2014)

Agency?

Step 1

Upheld

Overturned

Trumpeter Swan Soc'y v. EPA, 774 F.3dIs1037
s ue I- a bi l i ty to deny petitioners ri ght to fi l e

No

chevron and agency and defer! and date(geq (01/01/2014)

Step 2
1

Is s ue II - juri s di ction
NRDC v. EPA, 777 F.3d 456

1

1

Is s ue I- dea dl i ne

1

No

1

Is s ue II- conformi ty

1

1

1

Associated Builders & Contrs., Inc. v. Shiu, 773 F.3d 257

No

Verizon & AT&T, Inc. v. FCC, 770 F.3d 961

Yes

1

1

S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41

Yes

Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390

No

1

SEC v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 758 F.3d 357

No

1

New Eng. Power Generators Ass'n v. FERC, 757 F.3d 283

Yes

Sierra Club & La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 755 F.3d 968

No

1

NRDC v. EPA, 755 F.3d 1010

No

1

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 754 F.3d 1056

Yes

1

Nat'l Treasury Emples. Union v. Fed. Labor Rels. Auth., 754 F.3d 1031

No

1

1

Ill. Pub. Telcoms. Ass'n v. FCC, 752 F.3d 1018

Yes

1

1

Prime Time Int'l Co. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 753 F.3d 1339

No

1

1

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1079

No

1

1

BNSF Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 748 F.3d 1295

Yes

1

1

Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216

Yes

NRDC v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1055

No

1

1

White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222

No

1

1

NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474

Yes

1

1

Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 740 F.3d 692

No

1

1

Dish Network, L.L.C. v. FCC, 552 Fed. Appx. 1

No

1

1

Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623

Yes

1

1

15

16

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

10

Agency affirmed

Agency reversed

Step 1

Step 1

2

1

1

Total

Step 2

1

9

Step 2

14

8

1

SAMPLE SIZE = 25 applications of Chevron

All agency analysis
Step 1 ca s es

23

Step 2 ca s es

36

Agency affirmed
Step 1

Agency reversed

Step 2
9

Step 1
34

Step 2
14

2

Sa mpl e Si ze =59 a ppl i ca tions of Chevron i n 57 ca s es
Agency revers ed overa l l

27%

When ca s e res ol ved a t Step 1, a gency revers ed

61%

When ca s e res ol ved a t Step 2, a gency revers ed

6%

Independent agency analysis
Step 1 ca s es

4

Step 2 ca s es

16

Agency affirmed
Step 1

Agency reversed

Step 2
1

Step 1
15

Step 2
3

1

Sa mpl e Si ze =20 a ppl i ca tions of Chevron i n 20 ca s es
Agency revers ed overa l l

20%

When ca s e res ol ved a t Step 1, a gency revers ed

75%

When ca s e res ol ved a t Step 2, a gency revers ed

6%
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